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During the first week of December, President Trump hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. He promised an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Shortly after, however, a starkly different strategy for instability emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Strategic Pivot

This contrast exemplifies the central principle of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on trade and ending wars—though how this fits with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative stated this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Contradictions

This shift is major, but observers caution it is premature to judge its results. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis estimates this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Geopolitical Neglect and Strains

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Conditional Involvement

A similar tension flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Competitors

Experts see the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” she added.